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Abstract
The Shapley value is defined as the average marginal contribution of a player,
taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition N when one starts from the
empty coalition and adds players one by one. In a previous paper, the authors have
introduced an allocation scheme for a general model of coalition formation where
the evolution of the coalition of active players is ruled by a Markov chain and need
not finish with the grand coalition. This note provides an axiomatization which
is weaker than the one in the original paper but allows a much more transparent
correctness proof. Moreover, the logical independence of the axioms is proved.
Keywords: coalitional game; coalition formation process; Shapley value
JEL Classification: C71
1 Introduction
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is among the most popular solution concepts in co-
operative game theory, and has been used in numerous applications. It is based on the
following basic idea: considering any possible order for the players to enter the game,
take the average of the marginal contribution of a player over all these orders. This rule
can be seen as a particular way to form coalitions, that is, start from the empty coalition
and add a player at each step until the grand coalition is reached. This simple view,
however, is not suitable to all situations, and is quite restrictive from the point of view of
coalition formation. So it is not surprising that the Shapley value would give counterin-
tuitive results in some situations (see, e.g., Roth (1980), Shafer (1980), and Scafuri and
Yannelis (1984)).
Faigle and Grabisch (2012) have developed a much more general framework for a
value that is suited to coalition formation. It takes into account that several players
may enter at any step of the coalition formation process and also some may leave the
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current coalition. Moreover, the process is not assumed to stop when the grand coalition
is formed but may continue to evolve. Indeed, the evolution is is governed by a Markov
chain or any kind of stochastic process. The authors have presented two values, called
Shapley I and Shapley II, which define allocation schemes for this general situation. But
cover the classical Shapley value as a particular case. It appears from the study of its
properties that only Shapley II seems to be suitable. Faigle and Grabisch (2012) give an
axiomatization of Shapley II (see a corrected version in (Faigle and Grabisch, to appear)),
with a very complex proof, similar to the proof of Weber (1988) for the axiomatization
of the classical Shapley value.
The aim of this note is to derive a slightly weaker axiomatization, together with
a much more transparent correctness proof. In addition, the logical independence of
the axioms is shown. We replace the anonymity axiom (invariance of the value under
permutations of the players) by the weaker symmetry axiom (symmetric players receive
the same payoff) and base our present proof on the decomposition of a game as a sum of
unanimity games (as it is done, e.g., by van den Brink (2001); Faigle and Kern (1992)).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes coalition formation processes
and the allocation scheme (value) we propose. Section 3 gives the new axiomatization
with its proof for this value. Finally, in Section 4 we prove the logical independence of
the axioms.
Throughout the paper, N denotes a finite set of n players. We often omit braces for
singletons, writing, e.g., S ∪ i, S \ ij instead of S ∪ {i} and S \ {i, j}.
2 Values for coalition formation processes
We restrict our exposition to the minimum (see Faigle and Grabisch (2012, to appear)
for full details and more examples).
We call scenario of coalition formation process any sequence S = ∅, S1, S2, . . . of
coalitions in N that start with the empty set. A scenario need not be finite and repetitions
may occur. Also, it need not finish at the grand coalition. To avoid intricacies, we consider
here only finite scenarios ∅, S1, . . . Sq.
Example 1. Take N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Here is an example of scenario:
S = ∅, 12, 24, 3, 123, 1234, 12.
where 12 stands for {1, 2}, etc. In this scenario, players 1 and 2 enter together, then 1
leaves and 4 enters, then both leave and 3 enters, then 1 and 2 enter again, then 4 enters,
and finally 3 and 4 leave.
Example 2. Consider a permutation σ on N . Then σ induces the following scenario:
∅, {σ(1)}, {σ(1), σ(2)}, . . . , {σ(1), . . . , σ(n− 1)}, N.
Using all possible σ, we get the n! scenarios used in the classical definition of the Shapley
value.
The main idea of our value is very close to the original view of Shapley: compute the
marginal contribution of the players who are active during one step St → St+1 (i.e., those
2
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who are entering or leaving), and then add these contributions for all steps forming the
scenario. This gives a value for a given scenario S, called a scenario-value. The final step
is to consider all possible scenarios, supposing that the transitions between coalitions are
governed by a stochastic process, typically a Markov chain. Then the (overall) value is
obtained as the expected value over all possible scenarios of the scenario-values. More
formally, for a Markov chain U:
φU(v) =
∑
S←U
p(S)φS(v)
where S ← U means “scenario S generated by U”, and the scenario-value φS is computed
by
φS(v) =
q−1∑
t=0
φSt→St+1(v), (1)
with S = S1, . . . , Sq
1. Therefore it remains to define the scenario-value for a given tran-
sition St → St+1. In the case of the classical Shapley value, since in a transition a
single player enters and nobody leaves, the marginal contribution of the entering player
is naturally defined as v(St+1) − v(St). In our more general case, since several players
may enter or leave, the situation is more complicated. One first idea leads to what we
called the Shapley I value, and consists in using the principle of insufficient reason: divide
v(St+1)− v(St) equally among the active players:
φ˜
St→St+1
i (v) =
{
1
|St∆St+1|
(v(St+1)− v(St)), if i ∈ St∆St+1
0, otherwise,
(2)
where St∆St+1 = (St \ St+1) ∪ (St+1 \ St) is the set of active players. A less simple
idea, which turned out to be much better, however, is the decomposition of a transition
St → St+1 into all possible elementary transitions, i.e., transitions where only one player
can enter or leave at a time. We call this the Shapley II value.
Example 3. The transition 24→ 3 of the scenario given in Example 1 decomposes in 6
different ways, depending on the order of the active players 2, 4 and 3:
24→ 4→ ∅ → 3
24→ 4→ 34→ 3
24→ 2→ ∅ → 3
24→ 2→ 23→ 3
24→ 234→ 34→ 3
24→ 234→ 23→ 3
Since each transition is elementary, the marginal contribution is given to the enter-
ing/leaving player. Formally:
φ
St→St+1
i (v) =


1
|St∆St+1|!
∑
P from St to St+1
(v(S ′P)− v(SP)), if i ∈ St∆St+1
0, otherwise,
(3)
1We omit here the case of infinite scenarios for brevity. See full details in Faigle and Grabisch (2012).
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where ”P from St to St+1” is any path from St to St+1 in 2
N (like in Example 3), and
SP → S
′
P
is the unique transition in P such that either {i} = SP \ S
′
P
or {i} = S ′
P
\ SP.
Example 4. (Example 3 ct’d) Computing φ24→3(v) gives:
φ24→31 (v) = 0
φ24→32 (v) =
1
6
(
2(v(4)− v(24)) + (0− v(2)) + 2(v(3)− v(23)) + (v(34)− v(234)
)
φ24→33 (v) =
1
6
(
2(v(3)− 0) + (v(34)− v(4)) + (v(23)− v(2)) + 2(v(234)− v(24)
)
φ24→34 (v) =
1
6
(
(0− v(4)) + 2(v(3)− v(34)) + 2(v(2)− v(24)) + (v(23)− v(234)
)
.
Example 5. (Example 2 ct’d) The application of the Shapley II value on the n! scenarios
induced by permutations yields exactly the classical Shapley value, as is easy to check.
3 Axiomatization of the Shapley II value
We briefly recapitulate the six axioms used in (Faigle and Grabisch, to appear) to char-
acterize the Shapley II value.
We denote by ψ : G → Rn×S a scenario-value, where G is the set of games on N , and
S is the set of finite sequences of coalitions (not necessarily starting with ∅).
Two sequences S = S1, . . . , Sq, S
′ = S ′1, . . . , S
′
r are said to be concatenable if Sq = S
′
1,
in which case their concatenation is the sequence
S⊕ S′ := S1, . . . , Sq, S
′
2, . . . , S
′
r.
Concatenation (C): Let S, S′ be two concatenable sequences. Then
ψS⊕S
′
= ψS + ψS
′
.
Axiom (C) allows us to restrict our attention to transitions. Indeed,
ψS =
q−1∑
t=1
ψSt→St+1
holds for every sequence S = S1, S2, . . . , Sq.
Inactive players in transitions (IP): If i is inactive in S → T , i.e., i 6∈
S∆T , then ψS→Ti (v) = 0 for any game v.
Efficiency for transitions (E): For any transition S → T and game v, we
have ∑
i∈N
ψS→Ti (v) = v(T )− v(S).
Linearity for transitions (L): v 7→ ψS→T (v) is a linear operator over G for
any transition S → T .
4
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Symmetry for transitions (S’): For any i ∈ N , any transition S → T and
any permutation σ on N , one has
ψS→Ti (v) = ψ
σ(S)→σ(T )
σ(i) (v ◦ σ
−1).
i ∈ N is a null player for v if v(S ∪ i) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N \ i.
Null axiom for transitions (N):Every null player i for v obtains ψS→Ti (v) =
0 relative to every transition S → T .
Two players i, j are antisymmetric if v(K ∪ {i, j}) = v(K) for every K ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
Antisymmetry for entering/leaving players (ASEL): if i ∈ S \ T and
j ∈ T \ S are antisymmetric for v, then ψS→Ti (v) = ψ
S→T
j (v).
Antisymmetric players have in some sense a counterbalancing effect: they annihilate each
other when entering together a coalition, which can be interpreted by saying that they
bring the same contribution but of opposite sign. Therefore, if one is leaving and the
other entering, their contribution in the scenario becomes equal and of same sign.
Now, we replace (S’) (symmetry by permutation, a.k.a. anonymity) by the weaker
classical symmetry property as follows. We say that i, j ∈ N are symmetric for v if
v(S ∪ i) = v(S ∪ j) for any S ⊆ N \ ij.
Symmetry axiom (S): For any transition S → T , any i, j both in S \ T or
in T \ S, ψS→Ti (v) = ψj(v)
S→T whenever i, j are symmetric for v.
As pointed out in the Introduction, our proof of the axiomatization relies on the
decomposition of games into unanimity games. We recall that for each K ⊆ N,K 6= ∅,
the unanimity game centered at K is defined by
uK(S) =
{
1, if S ⊇ K
0, otherwise.
It is well known that any game v on N can be written as
v =
∑
K⊆N,K 6=∅
mv(K)uK
where mv(K), the coefficients of v in the basis of unanimity games, is known to be the
Mo¨bius transform of v (Rota, 1964), a.k.a. Harsanyi dividends (Harsanyi, 1963). It
follows from the above that
v(S) =
∑
T⊆S
mv(T ) (S ⊆ N). (4)
The following lemma characterizes games with antisymmetric players in terms of the
Mo¨bius transform.
Lemma 1. Distinct players i, j are antisymmetric for the game v if and only if
mv(K ∪ ij) = −mv(K ∪ i)−mv(K ∪ j), ∀K ⊆ N \ ij,
where mv is the Mo¨bius transform of v.
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Proof. If i, j are antisymmetric for v and mv is the Mo¨bius transform of v, one deduces
from (4):
0 = v(L ∪ ij)− v(L) =
∑
K⊆L∪ij
mv(K)−
∑
K⊆L
mv(K)
=
∑
K⊆L
(
mv(K ∪ i) +mv(K ∪ j) +mv(K ∪ ij)
)
for any L ⊆ N \ ij. For L = ∅, establishes mv(i)+mv(j)+mv(ij) = 0. Now, for L = {k},
we deduce mv(ik) +mv(jk) +mv(ijk) = 0, etc. until we finally arrive at
mv(K ∪ i) +mv(K ∪ j) +mv(K ∪ ij) = 0.
Theorem 1. A scenario-value satisfies (C), (L), (IP), (E), (S), (N) and (ASEL) if and
only if it is the Shapley II scenario-value.
Proof. The “if part” has already been shown in Faigle and Grabisch (2012, to appear).
We use the decomposition of games on the basis of unanimity games. By (L) and
(C), it suffices to prove that for any unamimity game uK , any transition S → T , the
quantities ψS→Ti (uK), i ∈ N , are uniquely determined.
1. Supposing S ⊆ T , consider the unanimity game uK for some K ⊆ N . Observe
that any i ∈ K is a non-null player while any other player is null. Therefore, by (E), (N)
and (IP), we obtain
uK(T )− uK(S) =
∑
i∈(T\S)∩K
ψS→Ti (uK).
Assuming |(T \ S) ∩K| > 1, any two players in this set are symmetric for uK . By (S),
we therefore have
ψS→Ti (uK) =
uK(T )− uK(S)
|(T \ S) ∩K|
, i ∈ (T \ S) ∩K,
and ψSi → T (uK) = 0 for any other i by (N) and (IP). Finally,
uK(T )− uK(S) =
{
1, if K ⊆ T and K 6⊆ S
0, otherwise.
In summary, we find
ψS→Ti (uK) =
{
1
|K\S|
, if K ⊆ T and i ∈ K \ S
0, otherwise.
2. The case T ⊆ S is analyzed similarly. We find
ψS→Ti (uK) =
{
1
|K\T |
, if K ⊆ S and i ∈ K \ T
0, otherwise.
6
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3. We consider the case where S \ T 6= ∅ and T \ S 6= ∅ hold. From (N), (IP) and
(E), we get
uK(T )− uK(S) =
∑
i∈(S∆T )∩K
ψS→Ti (uK). (5)
Observe that
uK(T )− uK(S) =


1, if K ⊆ T and K 6⊆ S ∩ T
−1, if K ⊆ S and K 6⊆ S ∩ T
0, otherwise.
Clearly, if K ∩ (S∆T ) = ∅, ψS→Ti (uK) = 0 for all i ∈ N by (IP). We assume hereafter
that K ∩ (S∆T ) 6= ∅, which excludes K ⊆ S ∩T . The above considerations give us three
cases.
3.1. Suppose that K ⊆ T . Eq. (5) becomes∑
i∈K\S
ψS→Ti (uK) = 1,
and by (S), (N) and (IP) we obtain
ψS→Ti (uK) =
{
1
|K\S|
, if i ∈ K \ S
0, otherwise.
(6)
3.2. The case K ⊆ S proceeds similarly and yields
ψS→Ti (uK) =
{
− 1
|K\T |
, if i ∈ K \ T
0, otherwise.
(7)
3.3. Suppose K 6⊆ T and K 6⊆ S. Eq. (5) becomes∑
i∈(S∆T )∩K
ψS→Ti (uK) =
∑
i∈(S\T )∩K
ψS→Ti (uK) +
∑
i∈(T\S)∩K
ψS→Ti (uK) = 0.
All players in (S \ T ) ∩K being symmetric, and similarly for (T \ S) ∩K, (S) yields
|(S \ T ) ∩K|ψS→Ti (uK) + |(T \ S) ∩K|ψ
S→T
j (uK) = 0, (8)
for arbitrary i ∈ S \ T and j ∈ T \ S, provided they exist. If (S \ T ) ∩K = ∅, we obtain
from (8) for k ∈ K ∩ T and from (N), (IP) otherwise
ψS→Tk (uK) = 0, ∀k ∈ N. (9)
Similarly, (9) is valid also if (T \ S) ∩K = ∅.
It remains to consider the case K1 := (S \ T ) ∩K 6= ∅ and K2 := (T \ S) ∩K 6= ∅.
We proceed in a recursive way on the cardinality of K2, and start from |K2| = 1, letting
K2 = {j}.
7
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Consider the game v := uK−uK\j. From Lemma 1, we see that i, j are antisymmetric
for v, for any i ∈ K1. Applying (ASEL) we find ψ
S→T
i (v) = ψ
S→T
j (v) for any i ∈ K1,
which yields by (L):
ψS→Ti (uK)− ψ
S→T
i (uK\j) = ψ
S→T
j (uK)− ψ
S→T
j (uK\j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by (N)
. (10)
Observe that K ′ = K \ j is such that (T \ S) ∩ K ′ = ∅. Therefore, either (7) or (9)
applies, and we find
ψS→Ti (uK\j) =
{
− 1
|K\T |
, if K \ j ⊆ S
0, otherwise.
This yields
ψS→Ti (uK)− ψ
S→T
j (uK) =
{
− 1
|K\T |
, if K \ j ⊆ S
0, otherwise.
(11)
Observe that the system of equations (8) and (11) yields a unique solution for ψS→Ti (uK),
ψS→Tj (uK).
Suppose that ψS→Ti (uK) is known till |K2| = ℓ < |T \ S|, and let us determine
ψS→Ti (uK), ψ
S→T
j (uK) for |K2| = ℓ + 1. Choose some j ∈ K2 and consider the game
v := uK − uK\j. Since i, j are antisymmetric for v, for all i ∈ K1, the same reasoning as
above applies, and (10) is valid. Now, ψS→Ti (uK\j) is determined by induction hypothesis.
Therefore, ψS→Ti (uK), ψ
S→T
j (uK) are uniquely determined.
4 Independence of the axioms
We prove in this section that all seven axioms are logically independent.
Consider axiom (C). All six remaining axioms determine φS→T (v) for a given transition
S → T . Hence the value ψS for a scenario S = S1, . . . , Sq defined by
ψS(v) = f(φS1→S2(v), φS2→S3(v), . . . , φSq−1→Sq(v))
where f is an operator different from the sum, satisfies all axioms but (C).
The situation of axiom (L) is similar: Our proof of axiomatization of φS→T (v) is
based on the unique determination of φS→T (uK) for any unanimity game uK , using the
five remaining axioms (IP), (E), (S), (N) and (ASEL). Hence the value ψS(v) defined by
ψS(v) =
q−1∑
t=1
(
⊕K⊆N m
v(K)φSt→St+1(uK)
)
with v =
∑
K⊆N m
v(K)uK , and ⊕ is an operator different from the sum, satisfies all
axioms but (L).
Therefore, it remains to show that (IP), (E), (S), (N) and (ASEL) are independent
for the axiomatization of φS→T (uk), for any transition S → T and any unanimity game
uK .
(i) Axiom (E): removing the normalization constant 1
|S∆T |
in (3) gives a value satis-
fying (IP), (S), (N), (ASEL) but not (E).
8
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(ii) Axiom (IP): consider the value defined by ψS→T = φS→T if 1 ∈ S∆T , and other-
wise
ψS→Ti (v) =


1− v((S∆T ) ∪ 1) + v(S∆T )
|S∆T |!
∑
P from S to T
(v(S ′
P
)− v(SP)), if i ∈ S∆T
(v((S∆T ) ∪ 1)− v(S∆T ))(v(T )− v(S)), if i = 1
0, otherwise,
Clearly (IP) is not satisfied, but it can be checked that all other axioms are.
(iii) Axiom (N): consider the value defined by
ψS→Ti (v) =


v(T )− v(S)
|S∆T |
, if i ∈ S∆T
0, otherwise.
Then ψS→T then all axioms but (N) are satisfied.
(iv) Axiom (S): consider ψS→T (v) defined as follows: if S ⊆ T , then ψS→T (v) is defined
as a weighted Shapley value instead of a classical Shapley value2, i.e., weights are
assigned to players. Otherwise, ψS→T coincides with φS→T . Then, unless all weights
are equal, this value is not symmetric, although it will satisfy all other axioms. In
particular, (ASEL) is satisfied because (ASEL) concerns only transitions S → T
where S 6⊆ T and T 6⊆ S.
(v) Axiom (ASEL): let us come back to the proof of Theorem 1. Axiom (ASEL) is
used only in case 3.3 where (S \ T ) ∩ K 6= ∅ and (T \ S) ∩ K 6= ∅ hold; it yields
Equation (11), which together with (8) determines the value uniquely. It suffices
then to take any solution of (8) not satisfying (11). For example:
ψS→Ti (uK) = −
|(T \ S) ∩K|
|(S \ T ) ∩K|
, ψS→Tj (uK) = 1
for every i ∈ S \ T , j ∈ T \ S, and S, T,K satisfy the above condition.
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